The circuit court did not err in affirming the probate court’s order removing Rose Walsh as personal representative of the Estate, as Walsh breached her fiduciary duty to the Estate.
We affirmed the circuit court’s order.
Rose Walsh, individually and as personal representative of the subject Estate, argued the circuit court erred in affirming the probate court’s order removing her as personal representative of the Estate despite her compliance with a prior court order.
Initially, Walsh argued the circuit court erred in finding the Family Home Order was not a consent order. Walsh contended that because the Family Home Order is a consent order, respondents cannot complain because she complied with the requirements of the order. We disagreed. The probate court did not remove Walsh for her noncompliance with the Family Home Order but for her breaches of fiduciary duty to the Estate and its beneficiaries.
Walsh next argued the circuit court erred in affirming the probate court’s order removing her as personal representative of the Estate. Walsh contended she did not breach her fiduciary duties because she complied with the probate court’s order governing the sale of the Family Home. Again, Walsh misunderstood the probate court’s decree. The evidence established that Walsh breached her fiduciary duty to the Estate. Walsh had a duty to administer the Estate in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Even if Walsh complied with the Family Home Order, she also clearly attempted actions not in the Estate’s best interest.
Walsh’s refusal to deed the Mill Street Property to the decedent’s son Jessie was also problematic. Jessie testified he wanted to use the Mill Street Property as collateral in the bidding process. Yet, despite the decedent’s specific bequest, Walsh claimed she did not think she could distribute the Mill Street Property without distributing the other properties. Regardless of the reason Jessie sought the deed to which he was entitled, we saw no reason Walsh could not have complied. Walsh testified the Estate was incurring expenses; however, she admitted approximately $370,000 in cash remained. Therefore, her refusal to deed the Mill Street Property to Jessie further supported her removal as personal representative.
Affirmed.
Crosby v. Crosby Walsh (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 012-016-24, 9 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from Charleston County Circuit Court (J. Derham Cole, J.) Gregg E. Meyers, of Byron, MN, for appellant; Thomas E. Lydon, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for respondents Jessie Fred Crosby and Robert Edward Crosby, Jr.; Kelvin W. Crosby, pro se. South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished